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One Play – Many Roles  
Mitigating Commitment Problems through 3
rd




 party peacekeeping successful? There is a general consensus among 
scholars and practitioners that 3
rd
 party peacekeeping helps to overcome commitment 
problems regarding the implementation of peace agreements in intrastate conflicts. 
However, it remains contested what explains this positive effect. Given the variety of 
approaches, this thesis aims at providing a classification of causal mechanisms 
regarding 3
rd
 party peacekeeping by focusing on post-conflict commitment problems. I 
will demonstrate that there are four essential roles, 3
rd
 parties can play: coercer, 
normative authority, mediator and observer. By directly exercising power, 3
rd
 parties 
change preferences of conflict parties as coercer and normative authority. In contrast, 
mediators and observers rather facilitate commitment by sharing information or 
providing preconditions for communicative action. Although analytically distinct, 
these roles often work in conjunction. Stemming from roles rather than effects, this 
classification begs the question regarding the compatibility of causal mechanisms of 
3
rd
 party peacekeeping.  
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One Play – Many Roles 
Mitigating Commitment Problems through 3
rd
 Party Peacekeeping 
1. Introduction  
Why are some peace agreements successful while others fail? Recent research shows that 
ending civil wars by negotiated settlements has become the predominant way of bringing 
peace to intrastate conflicts (Kreutz 2010: 246). Nevertheless, given the devastating failure of 
the Arusha Accords in Rwanda in 1994, reaching formal agreements might be a necessary but 
by no means a sufficient condition for durable peace (Sisk 2009: 4). Once a peace accord is 
signed, conflict parties are obliged to implement the formally agreed concessions. In doing so, 
parties enter a decisive period of peacekeeping, particularly vulnerable for violence to resume 
due to inherent commitment problems: How can A be sure whether B fulfils its obligations?  
Building upon quantitative research, there is a general consensus that the involvement of 3
rd
 
parties - i.e. inter-/transnational organizations or states - help to overcome commitment 
problems in peacekeeping scenarios (Walter 2002: 161., 1997: 360; Doyle/Sambanis 2000: 
789; Mattes/Savun 2010: 523; Hartzell/Hoddie/Rothchild 2001: 200). Hence, this observation 
signals a window of opportunity for the international community to pacify intrastate wars 
(Sisk 2009: 8f., 28).  
However, it remains contested what explains this positive effect of 3
rd
 party peacekeeping. 
Since commitment problems have been identified at the very centre of conflict termination, 
various solutions have been put forward (Jervis 1978: 167ff.; Posen 1993: 27ff.; Powell 
2006). In particular, the academic discourse is centred around realist and rationalist accounts 
that stress the importance of military capabilities. Yet, the universality of such theories is 
challenged by the variety of successful 3
rd
 party peacekeeping including also non-military 
interventions (Fortna 2004a: 283; Howard 2019: 13ff.; Mattes/Savun 2010: 522). Therefore, 
discussing 3
rd
 party peacekeeping shifted towards alternative approaches based on empirical 
case studies. Most recently, constructivist theories of peacekeeping stress the importance of 
3
rd
 party norm building, reputation and legitimacy beyond military means (Howard 2019: 
33ff., Billerbeck/Gippert 2017; Zanker 2017; Randazzo 2017). However, it is difficult to 
denote any causal mechanism of 3
rd
 party peacekeeping exclusively to one macro theory of 
International Relations. Depending on the frame one applies, legitimacy and reputation can be 
regarded in the light of rationalist as well as constructivist theories. 
Thus, given the manifold of causal theories that aim to explain the positive effect of 3
rd
 party 




compilations, these attempts are neither finite nor sufficiently specific regarding the 
dependant variable. For instance, Kydd (2010) neglects findings of constructivist scholars, 
while Fortna (2008) addresses various peacekeeping problems instead of focusing exclusively 
on the central problem of conflict resolution - i.e. the post-conflict commitment problem. 
Moreover, current classifications of 3
rd
 party peacekeeping fail to address the question of 
compatibility regarding distinct causal mechanisms.  
In this thesis, I address the issue of 3
rd
 party peacekeeping by specifying the dependent 
variable of causal mechanisms and by centring on different roles, 3
rd
 parties can play in post-
conflict scenarios:  
Thus: How can 3
rd
 parties mitigate commitment problems in post-conflict scenarios of 
intrastate wars? 
Approaching this question from a theoretical point of view, 3
rd
 parties change preferences of 
conflict parties, making mutual cooperation the most preferred option. Put into game theory 
terminology; 3
rd
 parties shift cooperation into coordination. Moreover, 3
rd
 parties may help to 
reduce uncertainty and fear among conflict parties. Two strategies can thereof be identified: 
(a) 3
rd
 parties exercise power directly or (b) they merely facilitate commitment indirectly. In 
this context, I will single out four roles, 3
rd
 parties can play: coercer, normative authority, 
mediator and observer. Each role can be designated to one of the aforementioned categories 
(a) and (b). Further, each of these roles requires specific characteristics regarding the 3
rd
 party 
who is set out to embody the particular position.  
The applied approach differs from the existing literature with respect to four major points: 
First, it does not take macro theories of International Relations as decisive criteria for 
classification. Hence, I avoid the problem of demarcation – i.e. one causal mechanism can be 
framed as belonging to more than one macro theory. Secondly, although building upon 
insights established by empirical case studies, the kind of reasoning underlying my 
classification is deductive rather than inductive. Thirdly, the proposed classification is specific 
as it centres exclusively on mitigating commitment problems. Fourthly, the proposed 
classification does not take the particular outcome as criterion for classification but rather 
establishes several roles, 3rd parties can play in order to mitigate commitment problems. It is 
with this regard that the issue of compatibility between various causal mechanisms arises.  
Providing a classification of causal mechanisms of successful 3
rd
 party peacekeeping, this 
thesis must establish the dependent variable, towards which the causal mechanisms are 




intrastate wars by drawing on formal game theory. Secondly, I will establish four roles of 3
rd
 
party peacekeeping. This is followed by briefly illustrate the empirical plausibility of the 
derived causal dynamics by considering empirical cases of successful 3
rd
 party peacekeeping. 
In particular, I will argue that 3
rd
 parties mitigated commitment problems as coercer in 
Zimbabwe, as normative authority in El Salvador, as mediator in Tajikistan and as observer 
in Mozambique.  
2. Defining the Problem: Post - Conflict Commitment Problems 
Addressing the question of what explains successful 3
rd
 party peacekeeping in intrastate wars 
requires focusing on emerging problems of post-conflict scenarios. This consideration gives 
rise to the following questions: How do civil wars end? What are the peculiarities of intrastate 
conflicts? Having identified the problem of commitment at the centre to answering both these 
questions, I will present a formal approach to commitment problems relative to cooperation 
and coordination games. 
2.1. The Peculiarity of Intrastate Wars  
 
How do civil wars end? Analysing patterns of conflict termination regarding armed intrastate 
conflicts
1
, one can derive three characteristics: First, the duration of civil wars tend to be 
longer compared to interstate conflicts. Secondly, most civil wars end with decisive victory, 
when considering the total number of intrastate conflicts since 1945. However, negotiated 
settlements
2
 have become the predominant way of bringing peace to civil wars since the end 
of the Cold War (Kreutz 2010: 246; Toft 2009: 6). But, reaching formal agreements is no 
sufficient condition for durable peace. From 1940 to 1992 only 43% of negotiated settlements 
regarding intrastate wars were successfully implemented (Walter 2002: 6). This observation 
suggests that peace on basis of negotiated settlements is particularly fragile (Toft 2009: 9).  
The reason therefore can be found with regard to the peculiarities of intrastate conflicts. 
Conceptually, what intrastate wars have in common is that belligerents are based within one 
and the same state. Thus, they occupy the same territory, making it difficult to clearly separate 
opposing groups. Hence, this generates uncertainty, as belligerents’ belonging is not 
                                                          
1
 I thereby follow the definition by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program UCDP: ‘Armed intrastate 
conflict’ is defined as “a conflict between a government and a non-governmental party”, whereby 
‘government’ refers to any “party controlling the capital of the state ” (UCDP 2020). Such conflict is 
considered an ‘armed conflict’ if “the use of armed force between two parties results in at least 
25 battle-related deaths in one calendar year” (UCDP 2020). I will use the expressions ‘civil war’, 
‘intrastate war’, ‘intrastate conflict’ and ‘armed interstate conflict’ interchangeably.  
2




conclusive and conflict parties cohabit in close proximity (Walter 1997: 338; Kaufmann 1996: 
148). Moreover, civil wars are often fought over identity claims, including ethnicity, religion 
and ideology. In particular, these kinds of conflicts are embedded into hyper-national 
narratives and hostile rhetoric, often accompanied by discriminatory policies. Narratives 
stressing the otherness of the alleged ‘enemies’ not only polarize already devoted fighters but 
also moderates. Thus, suspicion spreads. Trust and common ground - both necessary for 
cooperation - vanish. In this context, violence in terms of massacres or genocides hardens 
boundaries further (Fearon/Laitin 2000: 860, 865; Kaufman 1996: 156ff.; Kaufmann 1996: 
142). Besides ideational aspects, Hoeffler and Collier (2004) focus on economic 
characteristics of war. Accordingly, war is conceived as “an industry that generates profits out 
of looting” (Collier/Hoeffler 2004: 564). Both, the downfall of statehood and the disruption of 
markets due to civil wars create alternative economic opportunities. When the focus is set on 
short term benefits, primary commodities are considered extremely profitable. Consequently, 
some individuals or groups “do well out of war” (Collier 2000: 91, 101ff.). Thus, they have 
no incentive to restore peace. Under these circumstances, civil war is constrained by 
conditions of anarchy, culminating in an atmosphere in which life tends to be “solitary, poor, 
nasty, brutish and short” (Hobbes [1651] 1996: 89). 
Importantly, these characteristics do not apply universally to all intrastate conflicts. However, 
as Fearon (2004) argues, demography, ideational and economic aspects have a significant 
impact on the duration and outcome of war (Fearon 2004: 275ff.). Given that decisive victory 
is the preferred option for conflict parties, negotiated settlements are most likely to be signed 
if neither side has the capacity to actually win. Thus, negotiated settlements are often signed 
under conditions of stalemate between belligerents. Thereby, reaching stalemate implies a 
long history of hostilities. This is why the formerly considered characteristics are likely to be 
in place. Consequently, these civil wars, ending by negotiated settlements, represent difficult 
cases of conflict resolution (Fortna 2004a: 278ff.; Zartman 2008: 22ff.; Sisk 2009: 58).  
In particular, the peculiarities of intrastate conflicts define the very circumstances under 
which peace must be kept, once an agreement between conflict parties is formally reached: 
Peace agreements must address economic gains from war, hostile rhetoric and violence in 
order to succeed. By so doing, conflict parties are required to make credible commitments, 
whereby ‘credible’ is defined from the standpoint of the opponent. In other words; opponents 
must have trust that the other side sticks to its promises.  
The issue of credible commitment becomes apparent with regard to disarmament - an 




“critical barrier” to peace, as in many cases conflict parties lose their most important 
bargaining power by laying down their arms (Walter 2002: 20). In particular, problems arise 
in contexts of one-sided disarmament. The latter refers to a situation in which one side must 
disarm while the other side keeps its military capacity. This results in long-term power shifts 
regarding military capacities, inevitably favouring one side (Walter: 2002: 21.; Powell 2012: 
54; Doyle/Sambanis 2011: 44). 
In light of the above mentioned circumstances, I pose the following question: How can 
conflict parties credibly commit to hold their concessions to not exploit the vulnerability of 
the other side? Finally, peacekeeping - i.e. implementing the formally signed peace agreement 
- becomes a problem of commitment.  
 
2.2. Cooperation vs. Coordination: A Formal Approach 
Having argued that credible commitment constitutes a central obstacle to successful 
peacekeeping, this section seeks to provide a formal account of commitment problems by 
drawing on models of game theory. Such a formal account will not only help to get a better 
understanding of commitment problems but it will further point towards possible solutions.  
The severity of the commitment problem varies relative to its endowment. Put into game 
theory’s terms: commitment problems depend on the underlying game. In particular, 
commitment problems are central to cooperation games such as the Prisoner Dilemma PD. 
This concept considers two players who both have a dominant incentive to defect, even 
though they have a common interest in cooperation. This is because of two reasons: (i) 
Mutual cooperation does not present the best case scenario for either of the two. Moreover, 
(ii) there persists a certain level of uncertainty regarding the actions of the other side 
(Hasenclever/Mayer/Rittberger 2004: 30ff.). For illustration, one can derive the following 
formal model, whereby the numerical values depict the payoffs for each player:   




 Player B 
Cooperation C Defection D 
Cooperation C (CC) 1;1 (CD) -1; α 




The PD constitutes a dilemma if and only if α >1. Otherwise mutual cooperation (CC)3 would 
present the best case scenario for both players. In contrast, defecting while the other player 
cooperates (DC) constitutes the best outcome for the individual player within the PD. What 
makes the PD puzzling is the fact that even if both players know that mutual cooperation (CC) 
is their common interest, they end up mutually defecting (DD). Consequently, they reach a 
suboptimal outcome, since 0 < 1 (Hasenclever/Mayer/ Rittberger 2004: 45). This is because 
neither side can credibly commit itself not to defect. As defined previously the term ‘credible’ 
articulates a belief on behalf of the counter player. Roughly speaking, A must be sure that B 
cooperates, vice versa. Hence, if credible commitment exists, players overcome the dilemma. 
But this seems to be difficult to achieve given the former derived conditions (i) and (ii).  
Within cooperation games, the strength of the commitment problem varies relative to the level 
of uncertainty and the value of α. Suppose that the two players are friends who know each 
other very well. Under these circumstances credible commitment seems to be less difficult to 
obtain. Moreover, credibility increases when players meet in the future, as future situations 
offer occasions of revenge or rather reward. This is commonly referred to as “the shadow of 
the future” (Hasenclever/Mayer/Rittberger 2004: 34). The same works with regard to the past. 
If one earned a reputation as defector, one’s claimed commitment becomes less credible. 
Therefore, assessing the severity of the commitment problem depends on whether the 
dilemma occurs once – also called ‘one shot game’ - or regularly. Furthermore, the greater the 
value of α, the more beneficial becomes defection. If cooperation guarantees payoffs that 
almost equal α, players are more likely to compromise. Nevertheless, there persists a certain 
level of uncertainty given that mutual defection does not constitute the best case scenario for 
the respective individual. 
It is with this regard that coordination differs from cooperation. The Stag Hunt, also known as 
Assurance Game, represents a simple instance of coordination games. Essentially, mutual 
cooperation coincides with the Pareto Optimum of the game. In other words; mutual 
cooperation is the preferred outcome of both players:   




 Player B 
Cooperation Defect 
Cooperation (CC) 5; 5 (CD) 0; 4 
Defect (DC) 4; 0 (DD) 3; 3 
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In the light of these preferences, players do not have to cooperate in the sense that they have 
to give up their individual best case option. Rather players must coordinate their actions. Once 
this is achieved, mutual cooperation is self-ensuring, since defecting would decrease benefits 
relative to mutual cooperation (Hasenclever/Mayer/Rittberger 2004: 50; Doyle/Sambanis 
2011: 46). 
However, there remain some obstacles towards credible commitment also in coordination 
games. For instance, players may not know that mutual cooperation is indeed their best 
option. Hence, they do not conceive themselves as being part of a coordination game. Rather 
they assume to be playing a PD. Such misconceptions may be due to lack of information, 
which may result from deliberately misrepresenting information in order to increase one’s 
bargaining power during negotiations (Fearon 1995: 381).  
Nonetheless, commitment problems in context of coordination games must be considered 
weak commitment problems. By contrast cooperation games such as the PD give rise to strong 
commitment problems.   
Thus, mitigating commitment problems in context of intrastate wars requires determining 
whether the initial situation addressed by 3
rd
 party peacekeeping constitutes a coordination or 
rather a cooperation game. I argue that peacekeeping is understood best in terms of the latter 
(Walter 1997: 337; 1999: 43ff.; Kydd 2010: 103).  
Thereby, I assume the following facts: There are at least two conflict parties which I will treat 
each as unitary players – i.e. A and B. Further, these two groups have signed a formal peace 
agreement having reached stalemate. Accordingly, defection means non-conformance 
regarding the peace agreement while cooperation is defined as compliance with the peace 
accord. Given that a decisive victory would be the best outcome for either conflict party, 
mutual cooperation constitutes the second preferred option. If both conflict parties fail to 
conform to the peace agreement, the status quo is preserved. Given that the status quo gave 
rise to the peace agreement in the first place, there exists a common interest in mutual 
cooperation preferred over mutual defection. Consequently, the following order of 
preferences emerges: (DC) > (CC) > (DD) > (CD). Therefore, the implementation of peace 
agreements is accounted for in terms of a PD - thus, resulting in a strong commitment 
problem.  
In particular, commitment problems in context of civil wars become increasingly severe 
regarding the former derived peculiarities. Gains from reaching a decisive victory are high, as 
the winner takes it all. In formal terms this means that the value of α is extremely high. 




(Zartman 1995: 9; Doyle/Sambanis 2011: 48). The costs from being cheated on are increased 
even further with regard to expected power shifts in the future. As discussed in relation to 
one-sided disarmament, current cooperation might not ensure cooperation in the future. Given 
previous violence and hostile rhetoric, cheating on behalf of the other side is expected 
(Doyle/Sambanis 2011:40f., 44).   
Thus, this chapter concludes that commitment problems in context of civil wars are strong 
instances of commitment problems, since implementing peace accords requires cooperation 
instead of coordination. Further, the peculiarities of intrastate wars such as hostile rhetoric, 
expected power shifts in the future and spatial cohabitation result in a particularly strong 
commitment problem.  
Limiting the scope, this does not mean that the commitment problem is the sole problem of 
conflict resolution. For instance, the distribution of goods and offices must be addressed by 
the peace accord as well. But even if all grievances and all issues of distribution are solved, 
concessions must be implemented. Implementation consists in committing not to exploit the 
other sides’ vulnerability. Thus, commitment problems prevail and remain the ultimate 
obstacles that conflict parties must overcome in order to reach peace (Toft 2009: 26). 
3. Finding a Solution: A Job for 3rd Parties 
Various approaches emerged that aim to mitigate commitment problems in intrastate wars. In 
particular, focus is set on the design of the peace agreement (Mattes/Savun 2009; Mukherjee 
2006). Does the agreement entail power sharing provisions, dispute settlement mechanisms or 
the involvement of 3rd parties? Partaking in this discussion, I will centre on the role of the 
latter. In so doing, I define 3rd party as a state or inter -/ transnational organization that seeks 
to support the implementation of the peace agreement.  
Quantitative research suggests that 3rd party peacekeeping is positively related with the 
successful implementation of peace accords (Doyle/Sambanis 2000: 789; Mukherjee 2006: 
428). Yet, what explains this positive effect still remains contested. Thus: How do 3rd parties 
mitigate commitment problems?  
Building upon insights of the preliminary chapter, 3rd parties might change conflict parties’ 
preferences from cooperation to coordination – i.e. they diminish the relative payoffs of α. 
Secondly, 3rd parties may reduce uncertainty and build trust. In so doing, the initial strong 
problem of commitment is transformed into a weak commitment problem, as cooperation 




Scholars already addressed these two strategies of promoting commitment by conducting 
qualitative empirical case studies. The initial neorealist assumption proposed by Walter (2002) 
was partly rejected by empirical findings which suggest that also non-military 3rd party 
peacekeeping is effective (Mattes/Savun 2010: 522). In consequence, further approaches 
emerged that emphasize the role of legitimacy and information over military capacities in 3rd 
party peacekeeping.  
Hence, addressing the manifold of causal mechanisms of 3rd party peacekeeping, a systematic 
classification is required. However, classifying 3rd party peacekeeping is difficult.  
Intuitively, one might start by classifying according to macro theories of International 
Relations. With this regard, current causal mechanisms of 3rd party peacekeeping are 
motivated by neorealism, rationalism and constructivism. In particular, neorealist and 
rationalist accounts dominate the debate. For instance, Kydd (2010) provides an overview of 
rationalist accounts regarding 3rd party peacekeeping that stresses the importance of material 
capabilities and information. Yet, taking macro theories of International Relations as vantage 
point for classification poses a problem of demarcation: Rationalist variables such as 
reputation, uncertainty, trustworthiness and credibility could be considered as being socially 
constructed through norms and traditions (Sharman 2016). Given a certain context agents may 
feel normatively obligated to be honest and provide reliable information. Thus, constructivist 
dynamics produce reliable information which in return can be incorporated into rationalist 
considerations. Further, rationalist accounts that stress the importance of reliable information 
may also be part of a constructivist theory as interactions under certainty may construct 
further normative obligations. Knowing that the other side provides trustworthy information, 
one might feel normatively obligated to do the same. Hence, denoting certain causal 
mechanisms of 3rd party peacekeeping to specific macro theories of International Relations is 
not conclusive. 
Offering an alternative way of classification, Fortna (2008) distinguishes causal mechanisms 
of 3rd party peacekeeping according to their outcome. In other words; she groups causal 
mechanisms as either changing preferences or mitigating uncertainty (Fortna 2008: 102). In 
doing so, she omits that there are several inter-conflicting ways to bring about these outcomes 
that require specific qualities on behalf of 3rd parties. 
In response, Howard (2019) classifies three ways of how 3rd parties may exercise power in 
order to mitigate commitment problems: coercion, inducement and persuasion. Thus, the 
focus shifts from the effects of 3rd party peacekeeping to the means and tools by which 3rd 




In this thesis, I will follow a similar approach. However, I differ from Howard (2019) in that I 
identify four distinct roles, 3rd parties can play to mitigate commitment problems. Ultimately, 
this allows identifying crucial requirements which 3rd parties have to possess in order to 
implement certain causal mechanisms. Each role requires a different profile. For instance: 
Can a 3rd party be a coercer and mediator at the same time? When is bias of 3rd party useful? 
Addressing these issues will ultimately make peacekeeping more effective.  
Therefore, in this chapter, I will identify four roles, 3rd parties can take: coercer, normative 
authority, mediator and observer. One can further group these jobs by distinguishing two 
ways of how 3rd parties influence preferences of conflict parties and reduce uncertainty: Either 
exercising power or merely facilitating commitment indirectly. Thereby, I presume a narrow 
definition of power. In particular, ‘power’ is defined as “the capacity or ability to direct or 
influence the behaviour of others or the course of events” even against their will (Oxford 
Univ. Press 2020).
 
Accordingly, power is relational and distributive: X possesses power over 
Y. I follow this definition of power because of two reasons: First, it is intuitive as it not only 
conforms to the scientifically debated concepts of “power over” by Max Weber, but also to 
common language as the above definition stems from an ordinary language dictionary 
(Imbusch 2013: 11; Weber [1921] 2005: 28). Secondly, it reveals a certain characteristic about 
the agent who possesses power. Power in this very precise sense presumes an asymmetrical or 
rather hierarchical relationship between the ones who have power and those who lack it. 
Transferred onto the realm of 3rd party peacekeeping, there are causal mechanisms of 
mitigating commitment problems that presume a certain level of hierarchy between 3rd parties 
and conflict parties.  
In what follows, I start by analysing causal mechanisms and roles of 3rd party peacekeeping 
which work through exercising power first. Subsequently, I will focus on instances of mere 
facilitating commitment.  
3.1. Direct Influence: Exercising Power 
In this section, I will focus on causal mechanisms that require 3rd parties to exercise power in 
terms of hierarchical relationships. Accordingly, these mechanisms conform to a top-down 
approach of 3rd party peacekeeping. Thereby, 3rd parties function as coercer or normative 
authority. Whereas the influence regarding the former role is based on material properties, 






Traditionally, power is associated with the possession of material capabilities (Morgenthau 
1989: 71; Mearsheimer 2001: 30ff.). Two classes can thereof be distinguished: military and 
non-military capabilities. Whereas the former compromises military equipment such as arms 
and (wo)-men power, the latter consists in economic or financial properties. As defined 
previously, exercising power presumes a hierarchical relation between at least two agents. In 
terms of material means, power consists in an asymmetrical distribution of military and 
economic capabilities (Waltz 1978: 98). Roughly speaking; X’s material capabilities 
outnumber the material capacities of Y. Consequently, X has power over Y.  
In the aftermath of civil wars, this kind of a material power-relation between conflict parties is 
absent given military stalemate that gave rise to the peace agreement in the first place 
(Zartman 2008: 22ff.). In this context, 3rd parties function as Hobbesian Leviathan4 exercising 
power over conflict parties by using their material capacities in a way that changes the 
preferences of conflict parties (Walter 2002: 42; Kydd 2010: 103f.). Particularly, there are two 
causal mechanisms of how 3rd parties may achieve this: (iii) They raise costs of defection and 
(iv) increase benefits from cooperation. Such strategy of influencing preferences by 
sanctioning and inducing is commonly referred to as “sticks and carrots” (Whalan 2013: 56).  
Considering (iii), there are several ways of making defection costly, whereby scholars centre 
on the role of security guarantees by 3rd parties. According to Walter, 3rd parties may promise 
that conflict parties “will be protected, violations detected and promises kept (or at least that 
groups will survive […]” (Walter 2002: 26). Hence, 3rd parties promise to enforce cooperation 
by means of security guarantees. In so doing, 3rd parties address the issue of power shifts in 
the future. The loss in military capabilities resulting from disarmament is compensated by 
military protection. As part of security guarantees, 3rd parties may deploy military personnel. 
For instance, troops of 3rd parties restructure the battlefield by separating militias and 
establishing demilitarized zones. In general, the presence of 3rd parties’ military personnel on 
the ground makes military attacks against the other side costly as conflict parties have to fight 
troops of 3rd parties as well. This severely impacts the preferences of conflict parties, as costs 
of defection increase (Walter 2002: 41; Hultman/Kathman/Shannon 2014: 741f.; 
Hartzell/Hoddie/Rothchild 2001: 193, 203; Doyle/Sambanis 2000: 781; Mukherjee 2006: 412; 
Mattes/Savun 2009: 743ff.).  
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Economic and financial sanctions follow a similar logic. Economic sanctions presume that 
conflict parties are dependent on outside assistance as well as economic and financial ties. 
Hence, cutting these ties influences the capabilities of conflict parties (Goldman/Hardman 
1997: 171).  
At this point, it is important to notice that these causal mechanisms not only work when there 
is an actual incident of defection. They also have a preventive effect in terms of deterrence. 
What the above mentioned causal mechanisms have in common is their aim to mitigate 
commitment problems by increasing the negative consequences stemming from defection. In 
so doing, they implicitly make cooperation more beneficial.  
However, with regard to (iv) there are more direct ways of how 3rd parties increase the 
benefits from cooperation. This is identified by Howard (2019) as a means of “inducement” 
(Howard 2019: 80ff.). Coercers thereby use their economic capacities to promote cooperation, 
providing financial assistance and funding for conflict parties. This type of influencing 
preferences through economic or financial means is referred to as “peace conditionality”, 
whereby outside assistance is conditioned on the compliance of conflict parties with the peace 
agreement (Boyce 2004: 3, 5). As a result, conflict parties only get benefits, if they cooperate. 
Hence, this causal mechanism directly influences the preferences of conflict parties, 
increasing the payoffs from cooperation (Klimesova 2016: 37; Fortna 2008: 89ff.). 
In conclusion, as coercer, 3rd parties influence conflict parties’ preferences directly by 
exercising power. In particular, they use their capabilities – may they be of military or non-
military nature - to raise the relative costs of defection and increase the relative benefits from 
cooperation. Once the benefits of cooperation outflank the benefits from defection the initial 
cooperation game is transformed into a coordination game. Thus, strong problems of 
commitment become weak commitment problems.  
For coercion to be effective, the coercer – 3rd parties must display certain characteristics. As 
Walter (2002) puts it; they must credibly commit to enforce peace (Walter 2002: 43). With 
this regard, two characteristics become important: First, 3rd parties must possess enough 
military or economic power relative to conflict parties in order to impact the preferences of 
conflict parties in a significant way. With respect to economic inducement, this suggests that 
financial offers actually suit the interests of conflict parties (Boyce 2004: 13). Secondly, 3rd 
parties must have a genuine interest in the implementation of the peace accord. Imposing 
sanctions and deploying military missions is costly. If 3rd parties lack willingness of accepting 
these costs, deterrence may not work, as conflict parties assume that 3rd parties are unlikely to 




of guaranteeing such an interest. Further, Walter (1997) argues that “colonial ties, strategic 
interests, economic investments or alliance loyalties will enhance any commitment to 
intervene and will indicate the political will to persevere“ as well (Walter 1997: 340). 
Generally, if a 3rd party feels aligned with at least one conflict party, the 3rd party is more 
willing to take costs for protecting its ally. Thus, bias is favourable.  
 
3.1.2. Normative Authority 
While the job of coercer requires 3rd parties to exercise power through material means, 
normative authorities influence conflict parties’ behaviour by non-material properties such as 
legitimacy and reputation. In particular, there are two ways of how 3rd parties foster 
cooperation as normative authorities. On the one hand, they exercise normative power 
directly with regard to conflict parties and effect intrinsic cooperation. On the other hand, they 
apply the aforementioned sticks and carrots strategy by targeting support of conflict parties. 
Since normative power plays an essential role in both strategies, I will provide an account of 
normative power first.  
I define ‘normative power’ between two agents X over Y as “that power which stems from 
internalized values in [Y] which dictate that [X] has a legitimate right to influence [Y] and [Y] 
has the obligation to accept this influence” (French/Raven 1959: 159). Accordingly, 
‘normative authority’ refers to the agent that possesses normative power, i.e. X.    
In general, these two definitions conform to the concept of authority by Max Weber (Weber 
[1941] 2005: 122ff.). Essentially, the definition of normative authority entails three 
characteristics. First, the concept of normative power is relational; i.e. it describes a relation 
between at least two agents. Secondly, this relation is hierarchical in the sense that one side 
possesses normative power and commands over those who conform to the authoritative 
demand (Billerbeck/Gippert 2017: 274). For this to be possible, one crucial condition must be 
met: X can exercise normative power if and only if the audience (Y) conceives of X as having 
the legitimate right of prescribing conduct. This third condition is coined by Weber as 
“Legitimitätsglaube” – i.e. ‘legitimacy belief’ (Weber [1921] 2005: 122). According to Weber, 
there are three ways of obtaining such legitimacy. Tradition, charisma, and rational-legal 
considerations establish normative authorities (Weber [1921] 2005: 124ff.; Billerbeck/Gippert 
2017: 278f.). In consequence, examples of normative authorities are religious leaders and 
political institutions such as parliaments, monarchs, or the United Nations UN.  
How can this consideration be transferred into the realm of 3rd party peacekeeping? In this 




power to change the preferences of conflict parties either by targeting conflict parties directly 
or intermediately through exercising normative power regarding conflict parties’ vital support.  
Straightforwardly, 3rd parties may constitute normative authorities relative to conflict parties. 
Hence, 3rd parties have the ability to command cooperation and norm-compliance relative to 
the peace agreement. Given the 3rd parties’ normative power, conflict parties feel obliged to 
conform to the normative demand. Thereby, the reason for altering the behaviour of conflict 
parties is based not on the expected outcomes of cooperating, but “because doing so is 
believed to be right, fair and appropriate” (Whalan 2013: 56; Risse 2000: 4). This is what is 
meant by intrinsic cooperation. It is not the consequentialist logic as in the case of economic 
or military deterrence but rather the logic of appropriateness that brings about compliance 
with the peace agreement. However, the effect remains the same. Preferences are changed, 
whereby cooperation becomes the individually preferred option.  
Figure 3: 3
rd
 party exercises normative power directly over conflict parties. 
 
 
By contrast, 3rd parties as normative authorities may influence conflict parties’ preferences by 
targeting belligerents’ vital support. Accordingly, the power relationship does not rest between 
3rd parties and conflict parties but rather between 3rd parties and conflict parties’ supporters.  
Figure 4: 3
rd





This causal mechanism presupposes that conflict parties are dependent upon external support. 
Local civilians on the ground but also states or the international community as a whole may 
constitute such support. If conflict parties exercise normative power over crucial supporters, 
they might stop their assistance. For instance, outside supporters may hold back their financial 
aid, thus, raising the costs of defection (Risse/Sikkink 2009: 24). This consideration suggests 
that conflict parties depend upon their external reputation. In fact, conflict parties embed their 
claims and actions into narratives of justification. Accordingly, they intend to present 
themselves as ‘the good guys’ by stressing their grievances (Fortna 2004b: 21f.).  
With this respect, 3rd parties can use conflict parties’ strive for reputation in two ways. On the 
one hand, they sanction defection by shaming, whereby shaming refers to publicly 
delegitimizing claims of the respective conflict party. This might persuade supporters to stop 
their assistance. Conversely, legitimacy on behalf of conflict parties’ claims increases support. 
On the other hand 3rd parties reward cooperation by publicly recognizing conflict parties’ 
claims and grievances (Sisk 2009: 54f.). Through recognition claims gain legitimacy and 
might motivate external support in a way that payoffs from cooperation increase. Hence, in 
contrast to directly targeting conflict parties by normative power, the second approach works 
according to the logic of consequences by changing the preferences of conflict parties in a 
way that cooperation becomes the preferred outcome.  
Nonetheless, both approaches prescribe certain characteristics regarding the profile of 3rd 
parties. First, 3rd parties must constitute normative authorities either relative to conflict parties 
or relative to vital supporters. In both cases, 3rd parties must secure their source of legitimacy 
and uphold the audience’s legitimacy belief, as a lack of legitimacy implies a lack in 
normative power. Secondly, 3rd parties must have the means to reach out to their audience in 
order to effectively conduct shaming - for instance, by means of communication. 
3.2. Indirect Influence: Facilitating Commitment  
Instead of identifying ways of how 3rd parties exercise power, the following two sections will 
focus on causal mechanisms according to which 3rd parties serve as mere facilitators of 
commitment. Roughly speaking; 3rd parties do not use hierarchical relations, but rather 
influence preferences of conflict parties by providing infrastructure and information. I label 
this approach an instance of indirect influence via facilitation, since 3rd parties do not change 
preferences directly. Rather conflict parties mitigate commitment problems themselves. 
Hence, the following causal mechanisms conform to a bottom-up approach of 3rd party 





Mediation constitutes one way of facilitating commitment, whereby I presume a narrow 
definition of mediation. As Wallensteen (2014) and Bercovitch (2011) point out, the term 
‘mediation’ encompasses various types of 3rd party interventions. Some of the aforementioned 
causal mechanisms and roles of 3
rd
 party peacekeeping such as coercer or normative authority 
are traditionally discussed by mediation scholars (Svensson 2009; Mutwol 2009: 8f.). In 
contrast, I seek to be more specific by deriving a genuine role of a mediator. Ultimately, this 
allows a more precise classification of 3
rd
 party peacekeeping. In particular, I focus on what is 
labelled as ‘facilitative mediation’. According to this view, mediation can be defined as 
follows:  
“Mediation is the intervention into a dispute or negotiation by an acceptable, impartial 
and neutral third party who has no authoritative decision-making power to assist 
disputing parties in voluntarily reaching their own mutually acceptable settlement of 
the issues in dispute” (Moore 1986: 14).  
This specification of the term ‘mediation’ that puts the idea of power-free communication at 
its centre is opposed to the notion of “power-political mediation” (Lloyed Jones 2000: 649). 
The latter “emphasizes manipulation, forms of power, processes of bargaining, coercion, the 
ideas of quid pro quo, leverage and compromise” (Lloyed Jones 2000: 649). In short, the 
power-political approach of mediation conforms to the stick and carrots strategy discussed 
previously. Such kind of mediation assumes a hierarchical relationship between 3
rd
 parties and 
conflict parties.  
By contrast, facilitative mediation is characterized by the absence of hierarchical power 
structures between 3
rd
 parties as mediator and conflict parties. Mediators do not impose 
solutions. Rather mediation is a method of problem solving through communication between 
conflict parties without predefined outcome (Bercovitch 2011: 347). Thereby, 3
rd
 parties do 
not change preference functions of and foster trust between conflict parties directly. Conflict 
parties accomplish commitment themselves, whereby 3
rd
 parties provide the precondition 










 party provides for preconditions of communicative action. 
 
This type of mediation finds its theoretical underpinning in the Critical Theory. Particularly, 
Jürgen Habermas (1981) argues that peaceful communication creates collective understanding 
between rational agents given certain conditions. The “ideal speech situation” is characterized 
by inclusiveness, equality and honesty among speakers (Habermas 1981: 25f.; Habermas 
2005: 54ff.). Inclusiveness demands that discussions are open for all those affected by 
decisions to be taken. Equality is defined as the absence of hierarchical power relations. For 
instance, each of the speakers gets the same amount of time for presenting their argument. 
The third characteristic describes the openness of participants to tell the truth and to appeal to 
rational grounds.  
This approach has been applied to International Relations by Risse (2000). He argues that 
“seeking a reasoned consensus helps actors to overcome many collective action problems” by 
changing the identities and preferences of players through the application of ideal speech 
situations (Risse 2000: 2). 
Similarly, one can transfer the logic of communicative action to conflict resolution of 
intrastate wars. For instance, Walter (2002) discusses the role of mediation during 
negotiations prior to formal peace agreements (Walter 2002: 13f.). Going further, I argue that 
mediation is relevant in peacekeeping as well. In other words, mediation does not end by 
reaching a formal agreement. Rather mediation is an ongoing process of dispute settling and 
identity transformation. This is especially true with regard to the implementation of peace 
agreements – a period which often gives rise to misconceptions among conflict parties (Toft 




In particular, mediation constitutes a way of mitigating commitment problems. On the one 
hand, mediation enforces norm-compliance and thus, intrinsic cooperation. The conditions of 
fairness in ideal instances of communication make the outcome of such communication fair, 
i.e. legitimate and binding (Zanker 2017: 27). Roughly speaking, the fairness of the process 
guarantees the fairness of the output.
5
 For instance, if conflict parties solve a problem by 
means which they regard as fair, they are more likely to implement the outcome (Bercovitch 
2011: 351). In this context, local ownership is regarded as central principle that contributes to 
the fairness and normative bindingness of agreements. The demand for local ownership of the 
peace process is rooted in the communitarian idea of self-determination – i.e. “the right of 
societies to make their own choices” (Donais 2012: 5). In this sense, conflict parties own the 
outcome of their peace process as it is not imposed by an external 3
rd
 party through the 
exercise of power. In the end, fostering local ownership of peacekeeping makes the peace 
process more effective, as the needs of those addressed are directly dealt with. At the same 
time, the peace process gains legitimacy and becomes self-binding (Donais 2012: 3, 17; 
Zanker 2017: 3) 
On the other hand, communicative action changes the perceptions and identities of conflict 
parties. Emphasizing the human dimension of conflict resolution, Saunders (1999) argues that 
sustained dialogues can create and overcome hostile identities. According to this account, 3
rd
 
parties as mediators ensure peaceful communication which is characterized by the absence of 
rhetoric hostilities and power asymmetries. In consequence, peaceful face-to-face interaction 
changes previous hostile identities of conflict parties towards more peaceful identities, as it 
allows conflict parties to redefine their understanding of the conflict (Saunders 1999: 88). 
Further, Habermas’ conditions of communicative action ask conflict parties to change 
perspectives. By doing so, stereotypes are overcome and claims of the opponents may gain 
validity. Hence, preferences change in a way that cooperation becomes coordination.  
These two mechanisms can be applied by 3
rd
 parties on different levels of conflict parties’ 
interaction (Howard 2019: 37). At the lower level, 3
rd
 parties may mediate local or regional 
disputes on the frontline. At the top level, 3
rd
 parties may facilitate communicative action by 
supporting and accompanying power-sharing institutions in which conflict parties have to 
discuss and act in conjunction. Thus, the role of mediator consists in ensuring forums of open 
and fair communication between members of both conflict parties. Formally, the “attempt 
[…] to bring the parties together, so as to make it possible for them to reach an adequate 
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solution between themselves” by e.g. providing meeting facilities I institutionalized as “good 
offices” under International Public Law (Pact of Bogotá 1948: Art. 9ff.).  
As the previous definition of mediation shows, 3
rd
 parties that want to serve as mediator have 
to exhibit certain qualities. The most important one being impartiality. Further, mediators are 
required to be sensitive to the dynamics of the conflict in question. This means that they must 
have expertise regarding the issues at stake (Saunders 1999: 108f.).  
3.2.2. Observer 
Besides providing for fair conditions of communication, 3rd parties also facilitate commitment 
by sharing information regarding the implementation of the peace agreement. Hence, 3rd 
parties observe and verify data regarding conflict parties’ compliance. At this point, it is 
crucial to clarify the scope of what I mean by observer, in order to separate this type of 3rd 
party peacekeeping from others. In so doing, I follow a narrow definition. Accordingly, 
observers share information of conflict parties’ compliance with the peace agreement, 
whereby the information is provided voluntarily. Monitoring consists in verifying the 
information, i.e. determining whether the claims of conflict parties are true (Fortna 2008: 
93f.). For instance, 3rd parties may deploy military personnel that oversee decommission 
activities. In so doing, they schedule the timeline for and partake in the destruction of arms in 
order to verify the decommissioning efforts.  
Importantly, this type of 3rd party peacekeeping rests upon the consensus of conflict parties. 
This is what distinguishes observation from surveillance. Regarding the latter, 3rd parties use 
their military capacities in terms of intelligence and gather information that does not 
necessarily originate from a voluntary basis. Hence, surveillance constitutes an instance of 
hierarchical relation between 3rd parties and conflict parties and must therefore belong to the 
role of coercer. By contrast, observers facilitate commitment.  
In particular, there are two ways how 3rd parties as observers mitigate commitment problems. 
First, providing verified data regarding the activities of conflict parties raises the costs of 
defection. For instance, revealing the position of troops makes surprise attacks costly, hence, 
unlikely (Fortna 2008: 88). Secondly, voluntarily allowing observers to oversee the 
implementation of the peace agreement signals willingness and credible commitment to the 
counter player (Mukherjee 2006: 412; Mattes/Savun 2010: 516, Fortna 2008: 95) The more 
one reveals, the more credible one’s commitment becomes in the light of the others. Thus, this 




222). Conversely, verified non-compliance on behalf of the other side may justify ones’ 
defection (Fortna 2004b: 23).  
For both mechanisms to be effective, 3rd parties must be a reliable source of information and 
verification from the perspective of both conflict parties. The reason why conflict parties need 
3rd parties as observers in the first place, is because they do not trust one another. In short; one 
needs an impartial institution which decides whether the allegations and assertions are true. 
This characterization determines the profile of 3rd parties who want to function as observer. 
Although one does not require material resources or deploy a major amount of personnel as in 
the case of coercer, one must be neutral and unbiased regarding conflict parties claims.  
3.3. The Theoretical Argument in Short 
 
Illustrating the theoretical considerations underlying the proposed classification of 3rd party 
peacekeeping, one can derive the following overview:  
 




Strong Commitment Problem 
Cooperation Game with high level of uncertainty 
Strategy Power – Top Down Facilitation – Bottom Up 
























Genuine interest (bias) 
Normative power 





Outcome Weak Commitment Problem 
Coordination Game with low level of uncertainty 
 
The initial strong commitment problem is mitigated to a weak commitment problem by 3rd 
parties’ exercising power or facilitating commitment. In so doing, 3rd parties implement 






Based on this classification one can derive four propositions of causal mechanisms P1-4:  
 
P1:  As coercer 3rd parties mitigate commitment problems in post-conflict scenarios 
 by enforcing and/or inducing cooperation through material capabilities such 
 as military or economic force. 
 
P2: As normative authority 3rd parties mitigate commitment problems in post-
 conflict scenarios by shaming and persuading conflict parties using non-
 material capabilities  such as legitimacy and reputation. Shaming increases 
 external costs of defection while persuasion results in intrinsic cooperation. 
 
P3:  As mediator 3rd parties mitigate commitment problems in post-conflict 
 scenarios by bringing conflict parties together. Through communicative action, 
 conflict parties redefine their hostile relationships. 
 
P4:  As observer 3rd parties mitigate commitment problems in post-conflict 
 scenarios by sharing information between conflict parties. In so doing, they 
 reduce the level of uncertainty and foster reciprocity.  
 
At this point, it is important to clarify the scope of the proposed causal relation between the 
role of 3rd party peacekeeping and the commitment problem. In particular, I do not propose 
strict causality - i.e. whenever 3rd parties take one or more of the aforementioned roles, the 
commitment problem is solved. The causal link between role of 3rd party peacekeeping and 
commitment problem is much weaker. This is accounted for by the term ‘to mitigate’. In 
short, I argue that the proposed roles have an influence on the strength of the commitment 
problem. For instance, they impact preferences of conflict parties and thereby transform 
cooperation into coordination. Whether realizing certain roles of 3rd party peacekeeping is 
sufficient for successfully implementing the peace agreement goes beyond the claim of this 
thesis. Hence, realizing the roles of coercer, normative authority, mediator or observer is 
neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for overcoming commitment problems in the 
strict sense. However, they may be part of the explanation. 
Further, the derived roles of 3rd party peacekeeping constitute ideal types that are based upon 
theoretical considerations parting from a game-theoretical analysis of post-conflict scenarios. 
Thus, distinctions between coercer, normative authority, mediator and observer are 
theoretical in essence. They are analytically distinct in the sense that one role can exist 
without the other. But, from this distinction it does not follow that they are independent from 




questions: Who works well together and what combinations are favourable? Can one and the 
same 3rd party be coercer, normative authority, mediator and observer at the same time? 
Although the proposed classification begs the question regarding the compatibility and 
interdependency of different roles of 3rd party peacekeeping, this thesis does not aim to 
answer these questions in a satisfactory way. Rather, I centre on deriving a classification of 
distinct roles of 3rd party peacekeeping and identifying corresponding causal mechanisms. 
Once this is established, the issues of interdependency and compatibility can be addressed. 
Thus, this thesis provides the foundations for further research. Therefore, the following 
empirical analysis will centre on making the derived classification and proposed causal 
mechanisms empirically plausible without addressing the issue of compatibility and 
interdependency. 
 
4. Empirical Findings 
Having concluded the theoretical argument of the proposed classification, this section seeks to 
illustrate the empirical plausibility of each role of 3rd party peacekeeping. I.e., this section 
aims to back the former derived propositions P1-4 by empirical evidence. Limiting the scope 
of possible conclusions, two points are important to be considered. First, this section does not 
constitute a decisive test but rather demonstrates that the derived classification and 
corresponding causal mechanisms are empirically plausible. Hence, I focus on easy cases 
regarding the soundness of P1-4. Secondly, as already mentioned in the preliminary section, I 
centre on mitigating rather than solving commitment problems. Thus, I claim that embodying 
jobs of 3rd party peacekeeping merely decreases the strength of the commitment problem. 
This further defines the general objective of the empirical analysis. The relevant question is 
not what caused the mitigation of commitment problems. Rather, I centre on the influence of 
certain independent variables – the roles of 3rd party peacekeeping. Hence, do coercers, 
normative authorities, mediators and observers have an effect on the severity of commitment 
problems in post-conflict scenarios? 
Addressing this question, I will conduct four empirical case studies. Although, the four roles 
constitute ideal types of 3rd party peacekeeping which in practice often work in conjunction, I 
argue that one can detect singular effects of each role. In particular, 3rd parties function 
primarily as coercer in Zimbabwe, as normative authority in El Salvador, as mediator in 
Tajikistan and as observer in Mozambique. In all these cases, 3rd party peacekeeping 




I thereby operationalize ‘mitigation of commitment problems’ in the light of former derived 
characteristics that impact the severity of the commitment problem under game theoretical 
considerations: expected asymmetrical power-shifts in the future, expressed mistrust, hostile 
rhetoric and non-cooperation indicate strong commitment problems. In contrast, cooperative 
rhetoric, conceived high level of certainty and joint projects point towards weak commitment 
problems. Given that this operationalization regarding the strength of the commitment 
problem is based on subjective indicators regarding the perception of conflict parties, 
subsequent case studies substantially draw on personal testimony of conflict parties besides 
more objective criteria such as the distribution of military power.  
The subsequent sections proceed as follows: Having provided a short overview of the 
respective conflict, I will analyse to what extend certain 3rd parties embodied one of the roles 
of 3rd party peacekeeping. Subsequently, I will focus on the effect of the specified 3rd party 
involvement, applying the previously derived theoretical framework. 
4.1. Zimbabwe: Britain as Coercer 
The origin of the Zimbabwean conflict6 that lasted over more than seven years can be traced 
back to the end of colonial rule, when Zimbabwe’s white minority established an exclusive 
system of power. Tensions along ethnic lines rose during the late 1960s due to the 
introduction of further discriminatory policies. Eventually, the conflict resulted into 
widespread violence among ethnic lines: On the one hand two black nationalist guerrilla 
groups - Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army ZANLA and Zimbabwe People's 
Revolutionary Army ZIPRA – demanded equal representation and majoritarian rule. On the 
other side, the white minority in charge of the government was unwilling to cease power, 
fearing reverse discrimination (Stedman 1991:36, 41). 
Several attempts have been made to pacify the Zimbabwean conflict. These became known as 
the Victoria Falls Plan in 1975, the Kissinger Plan in 1976 and the Lancaster House 
Negotiations in 1979 (Walter 2002: 115). Walter (2002) argues that with regard to all three 
attempts 3rd parties played an essential role in getting conflict parties to compromise. 
Economic sanctions on behalf of the United States of America USA and South Africa induced 
the government to agree on concessions over political issues such as majoritarian rule. This 
was because the government was in need of outside financial assistance. While Ian Smith - 
leader of the white minority - initially opposed demands for majoritarian rule, political issues, 
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which gave rise to the conflict, were solved in 1976, when Smith agreed on power sharing 
institutions in terms of electoral reforms (Walter 2002: 122; Stedman 1991: 99). 
Nonetheless, violence prevailed as negotiations failed in 1976. This was because of the 
emerging commitment problem regarding the implementation of the reform proposal. Thus, 
having settled the political grievances, the discussion shifted towards safeguarding the 
implementation. In particular, rebels demanded substantial reforms of the Zimbabwean army, 
fearing that the government will eventually exploit rebels’ vulnerability once they disarm. 
However, this was rejected by Smith who insisted on holding control over the military in 
order to protect the white minority against black majoritarian rule (Walter 2002: 123; Stedman 
1991: 120). The latter was also a central provision regarding Smith‘s deal with a moderate 
fraction of black nationalists, which established Bishop Muzorewa as first black Prime 
Minister of Zimbabwe. However, this deal was rejected by the majority of rebels given that 
the former government would still hold central military power (Walter 2002: 130). 
Determined to find a solution to the ongoing conflict, Britain invited the remaining conflict 
parties to negotiate a comprehensive settlement. In so doing, Britain exercised substantial 
power over conflict parties. Giving internal as well as external pressure due to economic 
sanctions by Britain, the new Zimbabwean government participated in the talks. Similarly, the 
rebels were incentivised to participate in the Lancaster House Negotiations, as Britain 
threatened to officially recognise the recent Zimbabwean government on international level 
(Walter 2002: 132).  
Finally, the Lancaster House Agreement formed the basis for peacefully resolving the conflict. 
Essentially, it put special emphasis on post-war security concerns that had not been addressed 
satisfactorily in previous negotiations. As Walter (2002) points out, strong security guarantees 
by Britain constituted the decisive reason for rebels to sign the peace deal. In particular, rebel 
leaders urged Britain to expand their military involvement. As Mugabe, the leader of the 
ZANLA points out: He would not have compromised, if Britain had refused to enforce the 
agreement by military means (Walter 2002: 140ff.).  
In the end, the British Commonwealth sent more than 1,200 peacekeeping forces with robust 
– i.e. military - mandate. Britain seized transitional authority and oversaw the restructuring of 
the battlefield, whereby it kept the option to demand additional troops. Ultimately, the 
implementation of the Lancaster House Agreement was successful. In less than three months, 





In conclusion, the Zimbabwean conflict illustrates major points of the previously derived 
theoretical argument: First, the commitment problem constitutes the predominant problem of 
conflict resolution. Neither the rebels nor the government could credibly commit to uphold 
their concessions, once they would possess major control over military forces. The 
commitment problem prevailed, even after substantial issues of the conflict – such as electoral 
reforms - had been settled. Secondly, 3rd parties influenced belligerents’ choices by exercising 
power through material capabilities. Economic sanctions forced the government to negotiate 
in the first place. Thirdly, providing security guarantees in terms of military force increased 
the costs of defection in a way that built the basis for credible commitment among conflict 
parties. The case of Zimbabwe shows that 3rd peacekeeping through coercion is costly. This 
could be seen with regard to domestic opposition within Britain politics regarding extended 
military involvement. However, Britain’s interest in pacifying the conflict prevailed (Walter 
2002: 137). As former colonial power Britain was determined to end the conflict because of 
two reasons: Cold-War geopolitics saw a substantial threat of communist expansion in the 
region. Moreover, Britain feared further degeneration of the Commonwealth. Credibility of 
Britain’s commitment to enforce peace was especially strong from the perspective of the 
Zimbabwean white minority given their British descent (Walter 2002: 121, 163f.). 
In the end, Britain and the British Commonwealth served as coercer making cooperation the 
best case option for both conflict parties. I.e. they changed cooperation into coordination, 
thereby mitigating the commitment problem.  
4.2. El Salvador: The UN as Normative Authority 
“We were able to exert pressure through shame, cajoling and persuasion” 
- Alvaro De Soto, Representative of the Secretary General ONUSAL (Howard 2015: 358) 
When the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front FMLN and the El Salvadorian 
government signed the Chapultepec Peace Accords in 1992, the leftist guerrilla fighters and 
the government formally ended the civil war that lasted over more than 12 years. Given the 
lack of international support for the government and in light of the failed military offensive by 
the FMLN in 1990, both sides realized that neither party would actually win by military 
means. Hurting stalemate finally opened up the pathway to peaceful negotiations (Zartman 
2008: 26; Hampson 1996: 132). Starting with a framework convention in 1990, conflict 
parties agreed on a comprehensive peace deal. In particular, conflict parties consented on 
sharing power and reforming the country’s security sector. In effect, the agreement demanded 




(Hampson 1996: 143). Thus, implementing the peace accord, 3rd party peacekeepers had to 
deal with a particularly strong commitment problem. However, different to the Zimbabwean 
peacekeeping mission, the United Nations Verification Mission for El Salvador ONUSAL, 
which was established to oversee the implementation of the peace agreement, did not possess 
any robust military mandate (UN-doc S/22494; UN-doc S/RES/693). Merely, it compromised 
some 368 lightly armed officers with restricted use of force (Howard 2015: 352). Therefore, 
the military capacities of ONUSAL alone were inadequate to impact the conflict parties’ 
preferences in a substantial manner. Nevertheless, the peace agreement is widely regarded as 
successfully implemented (Howard 2015: 351).  
As stated in the San José Agreement in 1990, ONUSAL’s original task was to monitor and 
investigate human rights abuses (UN-doc S621541). The UN-Operation was part of a more 
general approach by the UN that put human rights at the centre of sustainable conflict 
resolution (Holiday/Stanley 1993: 416f.). At the same time, human rights provided the 
normative framework within which the ONUSAL operated. Since the Declaration of Human 
Rights by the UN, human rights are considered to be the moral compass of international 
politics, defining shameful conduct (Risse/Ropp 2009: 234). Thus, by making human rights 
abuses public, ONUSAL determined the international reputation of conflict parties 
(Stanley/Holiday 1997: 42ff.). This severely influenced the legitimacy of outside support. 
Essentially, normative power and public shaming was exercised through three main 
institutions in El Salvador.  
First, the ONUSAL’s Human Rights Division was in charge of monitoring present violations. 
In so doing, it developed a three-stage-scheme of “active verification” according to which 
information was gathered and assessed. Subsequently, recommendations had been proposed 
directly to the leaders of conflict parties (Howard 2009: 107). This routinized one-year 
procedure institutionalized a human rights dialogue, “making it easier for the UN 
headquarters to exert pressure on the parties while presenting them with facts from the past, 
and suggestions for the future” (Howard 2009: 106). Initially, the human rights division did 
not publish their findings at a large scale. However, this changed in mid-1993 as a response to 
severe public human rights violations. In consequence, ONUSAL extended its reach through 
education, radio and television. Ultimately, ONUSAL gained public confidence and 
established itself as normative authority regarding human rights within the El Salvadorian 
public (Howard 2009: 105f.).   
Secondly, conflict parties agreed to establish an Ad Hoc Commission to purge the 




seriously involved in human rights violations and ought to be dispatched (Howard 2009: 107). 
Since the government feared a military coup, if the findings were released, the final report 
was treated confidentially. Further, the implementation was delayed. This concession offered 
by the UN displays major tensions that arose between finger pointing and being an impartial 
broker between conflict parties (Johnstone 1997: 313; Howard 2009: 109).  
Thirdly, the Mexico Agreement in 1991 foresaw the installation of an UN-led Truth 
Commission. Its main task was to investigate past violation since the beginning of the armed 
conflict in 1980 (UN-doc S/23130: 5). The final report concluded that over 95% of human 
rights abuses could be ascribed to governmental forces. By contrast, the FMLN was held 
responsible for only 5% of past human rights violations. This severely damaged the domestic 
as well as the international reputation of the El Salvadorian government. In particular, the 
report contained detailed descriptions of the most severe crimes as well as the names of those 
responsible (Howard 2009: 109). Since the Truth Commission backed the former report of the 
Ad Hoc Commission, the UN and the USA put pressure on the El Salvadorian government to 
cooperate in the future and bring about substantial reforms within the military (Howard 2009: 
117). In addition, the truth commission also provoked criticism within the USA. By 
supporting the government in the past; the USA could be seen as partly responsible for human 
rights violations. For instance, the New York Times published opinions such as “Truth, Lies 
and El Salvador”, blaming the US administration for supporting human rights abuses by 
previously backing the El Salvadorian government (New York Times 1993: 20).  
In conclusion, 3rd parties such as the UN functioned as normative authority whose source of 
normative power was based on fundamental norms shared by vital supporters of conflict 
parties, both domestically and internationally. The UN established itself as the legitimate 
monitor of those rights. This was because of two reasons: They themselves mediated the 
peace agreement. Moreover, the UN can be seen as genuine human rights authority because it 
represents the international community and initiated the development of human rights. By 
generating public audience and strategically exposing human rights violations, ONUSAL 
influenced the preferences of conflict parties. Human rights violations would decrease 
reputation and cease support. Hence, normative power was exercised over supporters rather 
than over conflict parties directly. As response, “the government was compelled, one might 
even say shamed, by the intense international scrutiny to compensate for past atrocities by 
complying with the terms of the agreement and proving its commitment to a reinvigorated 




Although critics emphasized that ONUSAL could have done more to reach the broader public, 
the mission was celebrated as an enormous success (Hampson 1996: 168; Howard 2015: 351). 
Since ONUSAL, human rights monitoring has become a substantial cornerstone of UN-
Peacekeeping (Johnstone 1997: 336f.).  
4.3. Tajikistan: The USA and Russia as Mediators 
 
Identifying the causal efficiency of facilitative mediation is difficult, since mediation is often 
accompanied by coercion, inducement and monitoring in peacekeeping operations. Further 
difficulties arise by operationalizing changes of conflict parties’ identities. For, this 
presupposes drawing on private testimony rather than publicly observable indicators. 
Nonetheless, this section aims to assess P3, adopting facilitative mediation onto peacekeeping 
in civil wars. In particular, Saunders (1999) argues that the Inter-Tajik Dialogue ITD 
eventually contributed to a bottom-up peace process and reconciliation between conflict 
parties regarding the Tajik civil war.  
Initial hostilities were caused due to the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990. Given the major 
level of dependency from the former Soviet Union, Tajikistan - after gaining independence in 
1991 - struggled with economic downfall and weak political institutions. The new state was 
characterized by corruption and oligarchical structures. Combined with strong regional 
identities, these anarchical conditions of disrupted statehood led to a “clan struggle over 
power” within the new state (Lynch 2001: 54). On the one hand conservatives wanted to 
preserve Soviet principles and institutions. On the other hand, the United Tajik Opposition 
UTO, which compromised various fractions, dissatisfied with the distribution of power, 
sought to get equal representation. The conflict was further mobilized along ideological lines. 
Lacking a common idea of what the newly established state will be, conservatism clashed 
with Islamic fundamentalism. Weak statehood, ideology and strong regional identities caused 
profound mistrust and gave rise to strong commitment problems (Lynch 2001: 52; Saunders 
1999: 150ff.).  
Starting in 1992, Russia and the USA initiated non-official talks between polarized fractions 
within the Tajik society. Its aim was to initiate a sustainable peace process for the region. In 
this context, the USA and Russia as mediators provided moderation (Saunders 1999: 152).   
According to Saunders (2003) the ITD can be characterized as passing several stages. 
Initially, mediators had to convince people to engage in talks with their alleged enemies. As 
Sounders and Slim (2001) point out, the decisive criterion for the selection of participants was 




authority” (Saunders/Slim 2001: 45). Thus, participants were not merely some random 
moderates and willing individuals of civil society. Rather, they must be seen as active 
members of conflict parties, involved in the decision-making structures of these groups. 
“They have access both to the leadership and to public opinion in their communities” 
(Slim/Saunders 1996: 35; Voorhees 2002: 352; Matveeva 2015: 144f.). At the subsequent 
stage, participants identified major problems regarding their relationship. Participants stated 
that lacking a common idea of an independent Tajikistan and regional differences constituted 
the central problems of the conflict (Saunders 1999: 232). Following meetings aimed at 
discussing possible solutions, whereby participants agreed on promoting official negotiations. 
Having decided on a broad direction, the ITD established a more detailed roadmap. They 
proposed guidelines for official talks between senior leaders of both conflict parties. The 
Memorandum on a Negotiating Process in Tajikistan was distributed among conflict parties 
and the UN. Eventually, the joined memorandum supported the process of top-level 
negotiations. Hence, staring in 1994, the ITD was accompanied by official negotiations 
between the Tajik government and the UTO (Lynch 2001: 57). The ITD not only paved the 
way to these negotiations. Some of the participants of the ITD even took part in these top-
level meetings, which reached a peace agreement between the UTO and the conservative 
government in 1997 (Saunders 2003: 88). Simultaneously, the ITD produced their 
independent memoranda providing inputs for the official negotiations (Saunders 1999: 237). 
Although the civil war formally ended, the ITD continued its work until 2005. The dialogues’ 
focus shifted towards implementing the peace agreement and building long-lasting structures 
that secure the fragile peace. In particular, participants addressed educational issues and 
sought to adopt the methodology of dialogue to regional disputes. Calling for a multi-level 
peace process, the ITD emphasized the necessity of integrating civil society actors into the 
peace process. In fact, it stimulated various regional dialogues. In addition, the ITD served as 
recruiting base for political officials in the post-war state, thus implicitly influencing the new 
political system (Matveeva 2015: 161, 166).  
Ultimately, the agreement of 1997 was implemented to a great extent. This was also due to the 
UN who established an observer mission during the transition period. However, the UN 
mission only compromised some 120 military observers without mandate to enforce 
compliance (Koops 2015: 493). Thus, it could not draw on substantial military deterrence. 
Thus, it could not effectively employ the role of coercer. 
In the end, it is difficult to assess the effects of the ITD regarding post-conflict commitment 




collective understanding among conflict parties. Further, the ITD demonstrated that hostile 
relationships and identities are not primordial, but can rather be transformed by 
communication. In consequence, preferences of conflict parties changed from using violence 
to cooperation. Thereby, the ITD prepared citizens to implement the official agreement, 
connecting local people with top level negotiators (Saunders 2003: 89). This fostered 
commitment from bottom-up. Moreover, the ITD gained its own momentum, independent 
from the influence of 3rd party mediator. The ITD found its own solutions and peace process.  
 
 “They have moved from being barely able to look at each other in the first meeting to 
producing joint memoranda in 32 meetings [until 2003]. Then together without any 
initiative from the Russian-U.S. team, they have formed their own Public Committee 
for Promoting Democratic Processes in Tajikistan. They have developed their own 
strategy for peace-building” (Saunders 2003: 91). 
 
As noted previously, joint activities signal weak commitment problems. Even before UN-
observers had been deployed, the ITD issued joint memoranda. Hence, the initial strong 
commitment problem was mitigated even at this early state of the conflict. In all this, 3rd 
parties Russia and the USA served as mediators, providing for conditions that made 
communicative action possible. Therefore, although the case of ITD does not serve to 
conclusively test P3, it makes the theoretical considerations regarding the role of facilitative 
mediation at least plausible.  
 
4.4. Mozambique: The UN as Observer 
 
In 1992 The Rome Accord formally ended the civil war in Mozambique that lasted over 15 
years and claimed more than one million casualties. Although hurting stalemate was already 
reached in 1987, neither side could credibly commit to peace given profound mistrust 
(Howard 2009: 184). This was due to the characteristics of the conflict. The socialist 
government Frente de Libertação de Moçambique FRELIMO was challenged by the guerrilla 
organization Resistência Nacional Moçambicana RENAMO. The latter was supported by 
apartheid regimes in South Africa and Rhodesia7. Hence, the ideological dimension was 
complemented by an ethnic dimension (Howard 2009: 180). Lacking domestic as well as 
international support for either conflict party in 1989, there was a mutual incentive for peace. 
However, RENAMO feared that by laying down their arms they would become powerless 
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(Fortna 2008: 145). Hence, this emphasizes the particular strength of the commitment 
problem.  
Eventually, the UN established the United Nations Operations in Mozambique ONUMOZ, 
compromising over 6.000 UN peacekeeping troops and 294 military observers (Howard 2009: 
194f.). Essentially, ONUMOZ’s objective was to facilitate the implementation of the Rome 
Accord, whereby the Secretary General’s draft framed ONUMOZ’s primary function as 
observer mission (UN-doc S/24892: 5). Although ONUMOZ is considered a far-reaching 
mission in comparison to previous UN-peacekeeping, ONUMOZ was severely restricted in 
two ways: First, it operated under Chapter VI of the UN Charta, which is based upon the 
principles of consent, impartiality and non-violence. Thus, the mission’s use of force was 
limited. In consequence, ONUMOZ was inadequately equipped to enforce the terms of the 
peace agreement by ways of military coercion. Further, ONUMOZ did not deploy troops on 
time, resulting in a period of uncertainty directly after the signing of the peace accord 
(Howard 2009: 195f.). Instead of enforcing the implementation of the peace agreement, 
ONUMOZ’s military component is better characterized in terms of monitoring and verifying. 
This reading of ONUMOZ’s mandate is further backed by the language of mission’s draft 
(UN-doc S/24892: 5).  
Nonetheless, according to Teodato Hunguana – a senior official of FRELIMO - UN military 
troops constituted a “dissuading factor” regarding future hostilities as the mission’s presence 
fostered an atmosphere of security (Fortna 2008: 128). Further, the issue of international 
reputation and economic inducement from 3rd party donors played a central role for changing 
conflict parties’ preferences (Fortna 2008: 129).  
Apart from its limited coercive power, Fortna (2008) identified a further source of 
ONUMOZ’s success: building trust through monitoring. Drawing on personal testimony from 
conflict parties and ONUMOZ officials, she argues that by sharing information about the 
other sides’ compliance with the peace agreement, UN monitors provided a necessary level of 
certainty. Given profound mistrust, fuelled by long-lasting hostilities and violence, conflict 
parties were unable to provide trustworthy information on their own – neither to their 
opponents nor to their international supporters. As Teodato Hunguana notes:  
 
“If they violate the agreement, it’s not enough for us [FRELIMO] to say it. You need 
someone else to say it” (Fortna 2008: 145). 
 
In this context, ONUMOZ’ monitors served as trustworthy source of information. As argued 




the one hand, verification activities had an impact on conflict parties, as they could base their 
future decisions on reliable information. Further, parties had a genuine interest in cooperating 
with UN observers, as accepting UN supervision signals commitment to peace (Fortna 2008: 
147f.). On the other hand, ONUMOZ served as reliable source of information regarding 
whom to blame in case of defection. A central provision of ONUMOZ’s mandate was to keep 
UN-institutions informed about the conflict parties’ commitment (UN-doc S/24892: 10). 
Information provided by ONUMOZ served as basis for the Secretary General’s reports to the 
UN-Security Council. In return, the UN-Security Council constantly referred to these reports 
issuing resolutions expressing concerns and recognition regarding conflict parties’ efforts. 
Hence, information gathered by ONUMOZ could be used by normative authorities to impact 
conflict parties’ preferences via shaming. 8 
Besides passive observation, ONUMOZ also shaped the process of disarmament actively. It 
proposed a time schedule for the decommissioning of arms. In addition, ONUMOZ organized 
and oversaw assembly areas for government’s militias as well as guerrilla fighters (Howard 
2009: 200ff.). FRELIMO and RENAMO state that handing in arms directly to ONUMOZ 
guaranteed them that the arms are destroyed effectively and thus, could not be used by the 
other side. Thus, this generated further trust (Fortna 2008: 145).   
In conclusion, the ONUMOZ was successful given the interplay of coercion, normative power 
and observation. Testimony by conflict parties suggests that UN monitoring was a necessary 
condition for applying further peacekeeping policies. Without a neutral observer, it is difficult 
to obtain trustworthy information for conflict parties as well as for supporters.  
Therefore, one can detect a genuine role of observer:  
“You need military observers to sit down with local commanders, to explain the stages 
of disarmament, etc. the calendar, the various steps, what they have to get their men to 
do. They can’t just tell that to each other. The rebels aren’t going to believe what the 
government tells them. So you need someone neutral for transparency” – Mark 
Simpson, Carter Center representative to Mozambique (Fortna 2008: 145). 
                                                          
8
 An emblematic case of the interplay between observation and shaming can be found with regard to the 
following UN-documents: In his report to the UN Security Council the Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali 
was reporting the observations regarding decommissioning efforts of conflict parties conducted by ONUMOZ 
(UN-doc S/26385). Subsequently, the UN Security Council responded to these findings by either “condemning” 





Hence, although it remains unclear whether monitoring alone would have been sufficient to 
successfully implement the Rome Accord, it is perceived by conflict parties as having had an 
impact on their commitment to peace. Thus, this constitutes the empirical plausibility of P4. 
As becomes clear with regard to Simpson’s quote, 3rd parties have to be credible in the eyes of 







 parties mitigate commitment problems in post-conflict scenarios of intrastate 
wars? In this thesis, I sought to address this question by establishing a classification of 3
rd
 
party peacekeeping.  
Parting from territorial, economic and ideational peculiarities of intrastate conflicts, keeping 
peace becomes a problem of commitment. By drawing on formal game theory, intrastate wars 
are best accounted for by cooperation rather than coordination games. Since commitment 
problems are central to cooperation games, 3
rd
 party peacekeepers have to deal with 
particularly strong commitment problems in intrastate wars. Game theory also suggests a way 
of mitigating commitment problems by changing preferences of conflict parties from 
cooperation to coordination and by reducing the level of uncertainty.  
I argued that both can be accomplished by 3
rd
 parties employing four distinct roles that can be 
classified as either exercising power directly or facilitating commitment indirectly. On the one 
hand, 3
rd
 parties use their hierarchical relationship over conflict parties. As coercer, 3
rd
 parties 
influence conflict parties’ preferences, raising relative costs of defection by material 
capabilities. Traditionally, 3
rd
 parties draw on military deterrence through security guarantees 
and economic sanctions. 3
rd
 parties also exercise power through non-material properties as 
normative authority. Two ways are thereof to be distinguished: First, 3
rd
 parties exercise 
normative power directly over conflict parties, fostering intrinsic cooperation and norm-
compliance on behalf of conflict parties. Secondly, 3
rd
 parties target conflict parties’ support 
and thereby change parties’ preferences through external shifts of payoffs.  
In contrast to exercising power through hierarchical relationships, 3
rd
 parties also facilitate 
commitment as mediator and observer. Mediation builds upon Habermas’ theory of 
communicative action, assuming that trough communication former hostile identities can be 
changed towards peaceful relations. In so doing, 3
rd
 parties assist conflict parties in partaking 
peaceful dialogues. Ideal speech situations are characterized by inclusiveness, equality and 
honesty among conflict parties. Alternatively, 3
rd




observer. Providing verified data reduces uncertainty and impacts conflict parties’ preferences 
as reciprocity is fostered.  
Although these roles depict ideal types of 3
rd
 party peacekeeping, the second part of this thesis 
aimed at illustrating the empirical plausibility of this classification and its corresponding 
causal mechanisms. Therefore, I considered specific cases of 3
rd
 party peacekeeping. In 
particular, Britain and the British Commonwealth functioned as coercer regarding the 
Zimbabwean Civil War by providing strong security guarantees. Given the absence of such 
strong military guarantees in the case of El Salvador, the UN-Mission established itself as 
normative authority, exercising normative power regarding conflict parties’ support within the 
framework of human rights. Especially, public shaming in light of severe human rights abuses 
in the past pressed the El Salvadorian government to cooperate in the future. Regarding the 
role of mediator, the Inter-Tajik Dialogue assisted by the USA and Russia favoured the peace 
process in Tajikistan and demonstrated the transformability of conflict parties’ hostile 
relationships. As traditional peacekeeping mission, the UN-Mission to Mozambique operated 
as observer. Testimony by conflict parties shows that profound mistrust among conflict 
parties made verification through an independent 3
rd
 party necessary.  
In all these instances, commitment problems have been mitigated. But, I do not claim that 
embodying one of the aforementioned roles was sufficient to overcome the commitment 
problem in its totality. Rather, I argue that 3
rd
 parties impacted the strength of the commitment 
problem by functioning each as coercer, normative authority, mediator and observer.  
Further, my case studies show that several roles work in conjunction. Thus, this begs the 
question of interdependency regarding the roles of 3
rd
 party peacekeeping. Under theoretical 
considerations, sanctions are more effective if defections are detected. Hence, I cautiously 
propose that the role of observer favours the role of coercer and normative authority. This can 
be observed regarding the case of El Salvador. Monitoring human rights abuses made 
ONUSAL’s exercise of normative power via shaming more effective as officials at the UN 
could point directly to instances of human rights violations. Similarly, information provided 
by ONUMOZ’ observation mandate in Mozambique was used to condemn and welcome 
current developments by the UN Secretary General and the UN Security Council. 
The issue of interdependency further provokes the question regarding the compatibility of 
distinct roles - i.e. which roles can be taken by one and the same 3
rd
 party simultaneously? 
The answer thereof depends on the specific prerequisites of each role. Theoretically, I suggest 
that 3
rd
 party bias towards conflict parties makes coercion more effective as security 






parties to be unbiased. Hence, given that some roles demand inter-conflicting features on 
behalf of 3
rd
 parties, I cautiously suggest that one and the same 3
rd
 party cannot effectively 
embody all roles simultaneously. Ultimately, this opens up the possibility of multi-party 3
rd
 
party peacekeeping. But any such proposition goes beyond the scope of this thesis. 
In conclusion, I identified four roles of 3
rd
 party peacekeeping that mitigate commitment 
problems through specific causal dynamics. Although analytically distinct, these roles often 
work in conjunction. Stemming from roles rather than effects, my classification begs the 
question regarding the compatibility of causal mechanisms of 3
rd
 party peacekeeping that 
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